Has America Started a New Space Race for Military Tech?

Last month, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink shocked many defense experts around the world when he publicly disclosed that the United States has weapons in orbit capable of defending American interests. China and Russia promptly objected, claiming that space should remain a military-free zone. But their own military space programs reveal a different story – one that helps explain both the American announcement and the stakes behind it.

According to an Air Force account, Meink said that the United States has “on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile adversary action.” Meink did not identify the weapons, explain how they operate, or disclose when they were deployed. The announcement therefore leaves unanswered important questions about their capabilities while making America’s willingness to defend its interests in space explicit.

Beijing responded the following day. At a press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun reiterated China’s opposition to space weaponization, militarization, and an arms race. He urged the United States to “stop expanding its military preparations in outer space.”

Moscow voiced a similar objection. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters, “We believe that space must be free of any weapon,” and called for international cooperation toward its complete demilitarization.

But those statements ignore China and Russia’s long history of aggressively attempting to deploy offensive weapons in space. Both governments have developed capabilities to threaten satellites, and both have conducted tests that undermine their claims to champion peaceful space activity.

The American disclosure matters because satellites underpin modern military operations and even civilian infrastructure. Communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and missile warning depend on systems that adversaries could disrupt or destroy. Protecting those systems helps preserve the ability of American and allied forces to operate during a crisis.

Publicly acknowledging orbital weapons can also serve as a deterrence signal. It warns potential adversaries that threats to American satellites or other space assets may encounter resistance.

The historical context helps explain why American military leaders considers such capabilities necessary.

In a 2002 interview with me, former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger said Western officials had known since the early 1960s about Soviet offensive space weapons programs. He described a military effort concealed behind public assurances that Soviet space activities were peaceful.

Contemporary Pentagon reporting supports the broader account of sustained Soviet military investment in space. The Department of War’s 1983 Soviet Military Power publication described a deliberate program to exploit space for military purposes and reported an operational anti-satellite system capable of attacking satellites in near-Earth orbit.

Military reconnaissance satellites are not the same as offensive weapons like missiles, and developing a system is not the same as deploying it. Nevertheless, Soviet anti-satellite work established that threats to spacecraft were a practical military concern long before today’s controversy.

Russia continued pursuing counterspace capabilities. In July 2020, U.S. Space Command reported that the Russian satellite Cosmos 2543 released an object in what it characterized as a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.

A more damaging demonstration followed in November 2021, when Russia destroyed one of its own satellites. The debris threatened the International Space Station, prompting a NASA condemnation. The danger extended to Russia’s own cosmonauts as well as American and other international crew members.

China’s military space development likewise predates Meink’s announcement.

PLA defector Dr. Xiàhóu Li Wei told me that Chinese leaders have long sought “to blend peaceful and military purposes but prioritize war preparations.” Describing technology acquisition in the early 1990s, he said that “equipping the PLA space programs was a priority.”

His account places China’s space ambitions within its broader military modernization. A congressional report, dated January 1999, also warned that American technical assistance improving Chinese launch vehicles could benefit both commercial and military applications.

The clearest demonstration of China’s ability to attack satellites came in January 2007, when it destroyed its Fengyun-1C weather satellite. A NASA assessment documented the resulting debris cloud.

Meink’s announcement signals a more explicit phase of the space arms competition. America is entering it with a clear strategic imperative to protect the satellites that allow its forces to communicate, navigate, and detect threats. Leaving those systems vulnerable would give adversaries an opportunity to undermine American military power without confronting it directly.

China and Russia’s appeals for peaceful space should be judged against their actions. Both have demonstrated the ability to attack satellites. The United States has good reason to develop defenses against those capabilities, and publicly acknowledging weapons in orbit puts adversaries on notice that American space systems cannot be treated as defenseless targets.

International law does not prohibit all military activity in orbit. The Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and imposes separate restrictions on military activities on celestial bodies. It does not impose a blanket prohibition on conventional orbital weapons.

America is already engaged in a space race, but its military dimension differs sharply from the Cold War contest to reach the Moon. The prize is the ability to keep operating in space during a conflict – and to prevent an adversary from gaining an advantage by attacking first. Success will require effective defenses, resilient satellite networks, and the capacity to replace damaged systems quickly.

Decades of Soviet, Russian, and Chinese military space development show why declarations of peaceful intent cannot substitute for preparedness. Meink’s announcement sends a necessary warning that the United States intends to defend its access to space.

That warning must now be backed by capabilities that can withstand an attack and deny an adversary the advantage it seeks. The strongest measure of American success will be whether those preparations keep a war in space from starting in the first place.