Only Act Two in Iran

As the dust settles from the violence and destruction of Act One of the current military engagement in Iran, a clear assessment of this drama in three acts now appears as the curtain rises on Act Two.

Like any epic event, this realpolitik theater has a large cast of good guys and bad guys, most of whom make their initial appearance as the play opens. Usually in these matters, there are many more villains than heroes. In Act Two, a few more will appear.

Act One featured a protracted series of air strikes by the U.S. and Israeli military forces. These very successful operations decimated the political, scientific, and military leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regime’s top nuclear scientists. Iran, with its air force and navy so quickly crippled, responded primarily with missiles and drones.

Initially, these attacks were against targets in Israel and regional U.S. bases, but eventually they expanded to neutral neighbors in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar.

The jihadist regime suffered devastating losses in its nuclear development sites, ports, air bases, weapons factories, military installations, and government buildings and infrastructure from the U.S. and Israel. But it continues to brutally suppress widespread local civilian protest demonstrations by arresting, torturing, imprisoning, and murdering tens of thousands of its own citizens.

Faced with economic sanctions from the U.S. and Europe, Iran saw shortages of food, water, and military supplies, along with acute devaluation of its currency. It also suffered decreasing support from Russia, China, North Korea, and the armed proxies the regime had funded in Gaza (Hamas), Yemen (Houthis), Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria (Assad regime), and militias in Iraq.

Realizing that complete defeat of the Iranian regime could not occur by air strikes alone, the U.S. took steps to confiscate Iranian assets abroad, and to block most of Iran’s critical income from the sale of its oil and gas.

Iran responded by attacking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz through which a significant portion of global oil and gas passes. The U.S. then closed the Strait of Hormuz to Iranian shipping, effectively shutting off the regime’s primary source of income.

At this point, U.S. President Donald Trump, facing imminent midterm elections in November and growing U.S. voter impatience with the war, decided to seek a ceasefire with Iran. He negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the regime that would allow for the negotiation of U.S. demands over the course of 60 days.

The demands of each side are completely different, and there is a profound doubt that anything the Iranian regime agrees to would be honored. This skepticism is intensified by the lack of any single figure or group now in control of Iran. The IRGC and the political leaders appear to be at odds with each other and routinely assert they are not bound by any decision of the other in negotiations.

Already, the IRGC has broken its agreement to halt hostilities by attacking a ship in the Persian Gulf. The ceasefire is further complicated by the fact that Israel had no part in the MOU and understandably refuses to leave southern Lebanon as demanded by the IRGC. Its proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, also played no part in the ceasefire agreement, and says it will continue to attack Israel.

Act Two of this conflict, now underway, will transform a one-sided air war in Iran that has critically weakened its totalitarian regime and set the scene for the third and final act in which the Islamic theocracy is replaced by a new democratic government elected by all the citizens of Iran.

Act Three of the war will begin when the impact of the air war will be assessed to have so weakened the IRGC that the now-organized Iranian resistance led by Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi signals those who have suffered most under the regime, the Iranian people, to rise up and finish the complete destruction of the regime.

A number of conditions will be necessary for this “final battle” to take place, including the near collapse of the IRGC command and control, widespread desertions and instances of lower-level personnel in the IRGC and the Iranian army either switching sides or refusing to obey IRGC orders, and the arming of the civilian population. At that point, a genuine revolution can take place and succeed under the resistance led by the Crown Prince.

No large-scale boots-on-the-ground deployment of U.S. or Israeli troops will be needed. Only the Iranians themselves can finish the job.

Many of the necessary conditions for the “final battle” are already in place. Act Two is set to complete them.

The unanswered questions are not about what will happen, but when the regime will fall.

Herald Boas is an AMAC Newsline contributor.