While Chinese President Xi Jinping has spent the last decade consolidating power and installing himself as de facto dictator for life, an increasing number of purges within the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may reveal a leader who is paranoid and losing control of his government.
Just before Lunar New Year, the CCP’s internal police apparatus revealed the results of its largest anti-corruption campaign since Deng Xiaoping. In 2025 alone, party discipline authorities targeted 983,000 officials supposedly implicated in more than one million corruption cases. Most disappeared into detention or internal investigation systems that operate outside meaningful judicial transparency.
On paper, the campaign projects strength. In practice, it suggests instability at the core of China’s ruling apparatus.
Nowhere is that instability more visible than in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), where China’s top generals are vanishing at an astonishing rate.
In March 2023, Xi Jinping appeared before the nation flanked by what seemed to be a unified high command—loyalists hand-picked to modernize the PLA into a “world-class force.” Yet within less than three years, nearly all of the roughly 30 generals and admirals who led major departments and theater commands at the start of 2023 have been expelled, investigated, or have simply disappeared from public view.
The most stunning case was General Zhang Youxia.
On January 24, 2025, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection formally brought charges against Zhang and General Liu Zhenli. Both were accused of “serious violations of discipline and law” – the standard euphemism for corruption that frequently masks political purges.
Zhang’s fall was especially significant. As vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he was effectively Xi’s top operational commander. Widely regarded as Xi’s closest military ally, Zhang was also the last prominent “princeling” in the Politburo aligned with Xi through family and revolutionary ties. Their fathers shared Shaanxi roots dating back to the Long March. Zhang’s elite upbringing and decades-long relationship with Xi had made him a trusted intermediary between the military, party elders, and the political establishment.
His removal decimated the seven-member CMC. In fact, recent purges have reduced the body to just two active figures: Xi himself and General Zhang Shengmin, the officer responsible for overseeing anti-corruption investigations within the armed forces. Zhang Shengmin built his career in political discipline inspection, particularly within the Rocket Force – the branch controlling China’s nuclear and conventional missile arsenal.
The purge has not been confined to the CMC. It has eviscerated the Rocket Force, the Navy, and all five theater commands, including the Eastern Theater Command responsible for operations around Taiwan. At least 14 full-rank generals have been sacked or investigated in the past three years. Nine senior generals were removed in October 2025 alone.
Official PLA newspapers have acknowledged that the dismissals are causing “short-term hardships and pain,” even while insisting a stronger military will eventually emerge.
To outside observers and to some former insiders, the scale of disruption suggests something deeper than routine anti-graft enforcement.
Former PLA officers who have defected to the West described the CCP as “far from a caring Christian fellowship or a close-knit family.” Instead, they characterized it as “a ruthless arena where power is everything” and “even the closest allies are sacrificed when it suits the moment.”
“A desperate rival faction released damaging ‘black material’ against Zhang,” said Dr. Xiàhóu Li Wei, a former senior CCP security official. “These revelations were said to expose Zhang’s patronage and family wealth to Xi.”
Whether corruption charges are genuine or political pretexts remains opaque. As Professor Chong Ja Ian of the National University of Singapore noted, “The actual language surrounding the purges does not provide much detail about what exactly is going on internally, whether it really is corruption, political struggles, outright purges, or something else.” He added that publicity surrounding the purges is “meant to be a signal… suggesting the heavy consequences of either being corrupt or not following Xi’s preferences closely enough.”
The consequences are strategic as well as political. The abrupt removal of top “operational” commanders could temporarily undermine military readiness. Some analysts have compared the upheaval to the level of mistrust seen during the Cultural Revolution.
At a January 2026 session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, nearly half of China’s generals were reportedly absent. Reports indicate the purge has reached deep into mid-level ranks. Cai Xia, a former Central Party School professor, has asserted that a former CMC vice chairman established an independent division in Langfang that refused to deploy without direct orders—an extraordinary claim suggesting internal fragmentation.
Apparent technical failures – from frozen missile silos to failed aircraft carrier catapults – have further fueled speculation that infighting and fear are eroding institutional cohesion.
“Purges that began not yesterday but three years ago” are evidence of “a severe” crisis in the army, said another former PLA officer, calling the situation “dramatic.”
Yet paradoxically, the chaos strengthens Xi personally.
At a recent party session, Xi declared that officials must live by the principle: “I dare not, cannot, and do not want to be corrupt,” urging comrades to treat corruption as “inappropriate, undesirable, and unthinkable.” Wang Huning called for “closer unity around Comrade Xi.”
The message is unmistakable that loyalty to Xi is now synonymous with loyalty to the Party.
To remain secure, Xi must also balance powerful elite families – the heirs of former revolutionary leaders who dominate sectors tied to national security. As Colonel Lu Jianhong, who defected in the late 1980s, observed, “This is not a mere legend, but reflects the logic behind the CCP’s ceaseless struggle for power. There are also those who are frustrated with Xi.”
Professor Shuh-Fan Ding of National Chengchi University notes that Xi appears in no rush to refill top military vacancies. It can take years for an officer to accumulate the necessary credentials. “This year, in 2026, Xi will focus on purges,” Ding predicted.
The picture that emerges is complex. The removal of nearly a million officials in a single year – and the decapitation of China’s military high command – could signal a regime paralyzed by fear and mistrust.
But it could also mark the final stage of Xi’s consolidation of power.
Where seven generals once stood beside him on the Central Military Commission, only one now remains. The armor may be cracking – but the man inside is tightening his grip.
Ben Solis is the pen name of an international affairs journalist, historian, and researcher.
Usually where there is a purge axe falls after, heads roll. How many and whose, only the purger knows.No one is safe, ever,that is the communist tactic, keep them in fear.
It happened early in his political dominance so that he could achieve that dominance. He is most likely doing it now to put into place the people who will help him achieve the global dominance that is part of CCP’s 100 year plan.
Communism is a disease. They don’t trust themselves. Bela Kun.Trotsky. Karl Marx. They are the same.
Some-Ting-Wong .