With the Farm, Food and National Security Act of 2026 (or simply the “Farm Bill”) currently making its way through Congress, most of the attention has focused on the usual fights over subsidies, nutrition programs, conservation funding, and rural development. But buried inside the broader debate is another issue that may prove just as consequential – whether the United States will finally stop China and other foreign adversaries from purchasing American farmland.
For years, China experts have warned about strategic purchases of American farmland by Chinese individuals and groups linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Department of Agriculture data, Chinese-linked entities owned about 250,000 acres of American farmland at the end of 2024.
That’s still only a tiny sliver of the overall farmland in the United States – about 0.03 percent. But raw acreage does not tell the whole story.
The real concern is not simply how much land Chinese entities own, but where that land is located, who truly controls it, how it was purchased, and whether ownership is hidden behind corporations, shell companies, or proxies. Specifically, much of the farmland in question is located close to U.S. military bases and sensitive government installations.
That is why the issue has moved from a niche agricultural concern to a national security priority. In addition to espionage concerns, farmland can mean access to water, roads, ports, food infrastructure, rail lines, and energy assets – all vulnerable targets in a potential conflict.
Colonel Jianhong, a former Chinese military officer who defected to the West in the 1980s and now lives under protection, warned that American policymakers should not measure the threat only in acres. “The amount is less important than its location and exposure, whether it is owned by a registered individual or through a proxy preferred by the CCP,” he said.
Former PLA officials interviewed for this piece offered a similar warning. They said the CCP has long viewed American territory as a potential theater in the event of a wider conflict, and that using foreign territory under Beijing’s influence for PLA purposes is “realistic, not science fiction.”
For Americans accustomed to viewing farmland as private property and family heritage, that may sound extreme. But Beijing does not view land, industry, transportation, technology, or even private citizens through a normal Western lens. The CCP’s military-civil fusion strategy is built on the premise that civilian assets can be mobilized for Party and military objectives when needed.
Jianhong said CCP-linked actors abroad should be understood in that context. Citizens are “seen as soldiers,” he said, expected to serve the Party when called upon. In a crisis, he warned, hidden networks and assets could be used to create “confusion, disorientation, chaos, and, finally, paralysis.”
As more American lawmakers are recognizing, the United States would be foolish to assume that land purchases by entities tied to a hostile regime are purely for commercial interests.
The asymmetry is also impossible to ignore. China would never allow Americans, American companies, or U.S.-linked entities to freely buy up land near Chinese military bases, ports, infrastructure hubs, or agricultural assets. In fact, China does not recognize private land ownership in the American sense at all. Urban land is owned by the state, while rural land is generally controlled through collective arrangements ultimately subject to CCP power.
As CCP dissident Chu Xaoi explained, the legal terminology can obscure the reality. In China, the law may refer to “government” ownership or “village collectives,” but “this simply muddies the waters,” he said. “The CCP holds ownership.”
A former senior Chinese security official who left the country in the late 1990s and uses the name Haoxuan for his safety put the point even more bluntly. “The unelected Party treats everyone as a threat to its rule,” he said. “To the CCP, Western foreigners are enemies.”
Yet for decades, America has allowed foreign entities to exploit the openness of its own private property system with relatively limited scrutiny. States have begun to recognize the danger. Since 2023, dozens of states have considered or passed measures restricting foreign ownership of agricultural land, particularly by entities linked to China and other adversarial nations. These efforts are welcome and overdue, but insufficient on their own. A patchwork of state laws is not a national security strategy.
A hostile foreign power like China only needs to find the weakest jurisdiction, the murkiest ownership structure, or the most strategically useful parcel. Some states may act aggressively. Others may move slowly. Still others may lack the enforcement capacity to detect indirect ownership or proxy purchases. The federal government must lead to protect America from this threat.
That is why the Farm Bill is so important. The House-passed version of this legislation includes provisions aimed at foreign adversary ownership of agricultural land, including stronger reporting, improved coordination between USDA and national security officials, and a ban on agricultural land purchases by foreign adversaries and state sponsors of terrorism.
Those provisions belong at the center of the debate. Farmland is not just dirt, but production, supply chains, water, logistics, and proximity to assets America may need in a crisis.
Separate legislation from Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Rep. Dusty Johnson (R-SD), the Protecting U.S. Farmland and Sensitive Sites from Foreign Adversaries Act, would go even further by tightening federal scrutiny of farmland and sensitive-site purchases by foreign adversaries. That proposal is another sign that Congress is waking up to the scale of the problem. But the immediate opportunity is the Farm Bill, where lawmakers already have a vehicle to act.
Colonel Jianhong called federal restrictions on adversary land purchases “a shield against the ambitions of the CCP and PLA” and “a barrier to their advance.” Its importance, he said, “cannot be overstated.”
He is right. America’s openness is one of its great strengths. But openness without vigilance becomes vulnerability. Congress should use the Farm Bill to make clear that America’s farmland, food supply, and sensitive sites are not for sale to hostile powers.
Ben Solis is the pen name of an international affairs journalist, historian, and researcher.
