AMAC Exclusive – By Walter Samuel
On December 10, Javier Milei will be inaugurated as president of Argentina, having won the runoff over his Peronist rival, Economy Minister Sergio Massa, by a margin of 56%-44%. Milei, a libertarian economist who has praised Donald Trump and, most unusually for an Argentine politician, praised Margaret Thatcher, prompted some brief curiosity from the international press before they moved on to covering pro-Hamas protests.
There is something fascinating in the relatively muted reaction to Milei’s election following the panic that preceded it. Prior to his election, Milei was alternatively described as populist, “far right,” and a threat to democracy.
But far from a rigid conservative or liberal, Milei has an unusual mixture of policy preferences – abolishing Argentina’s Central Bank, for decades used as a campaign fund for the ruling Peronists; switching to the U.S. Dollar; moving the Argentine embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; Pro-life, but open to gay rights.
But for Milei’s opponents, his eccentric behaviors became more of a focus than his ideas. As an unmarried academic economist who had cloned his dead dog and campaigned with a chainsaw as a metaphor for what he intended to do to bloated government bureaucracies, it seemed an easy task to conflate his somewhat odd personal quirks with extremist policy.
Democrats in the United States made the same mistake with Donald Trump, who mixed an unusual personality and approach with what would have been conventional policies a few decades ago before globalization transformed how politics was understood.
Like Trump, Milei’s real offense was to not just reject this framework, but to threaten to succeed while doing so. One of the more horrifying realizations elites have made since 2016 has been that their neoliberal program –globalized trade, austerity for infrastructure combined with profligate welfare spending, and conflating liberalism with whatever cultural fads their kids found online — is actually unpopular with the voters.
It is worth noting that Democrats did not campaign against Donald Trump on policy, knowing it would be counterproductive. Instead, they framed the contest as one between chaos and order, however poorly their version of order was serving the public.
Similarly, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil was cast as a mentally unstable would-be tyrant. The Turkish opposition, meanwhile, has charged Erdogan with dreaming of being a Sultan or even Caliph rather than explaining what they would do differently when it came to relations with the U.S., Russia, or even the local economy. The Polish opposition largely campaigned on a vague platform of “defending democracy,” against a government whose foreign policy they agreed with, and whose economic record they were too scared to challenge.
When it came to Argentina, Javier Milei was portrayed by the left as a threat to Argentine democracy, to his neighbors, and to the international system. He was unstable, voters were told. The media spread bizarre claims that Milei received policy advice from his dogs and was an admirer of those other “madmen,” Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro.
Milei’s love of Israel, which has even culminated in an announced conversion to Judaism, is treated as a sign of instability rather than principle.
The greatest interventions against Milei came from those most threatened by his rise to power: fellow world leaders invested in the existing order, even if they nominally were antagonists within it.
Brazil’s President Lula da Silva, treating the contest between Milei and Massa as a proxy battle with his old nemesis, Bolsonaro, dispatched a campaign team and arranged for Argentina to be offered membership in the BRICS alliance with China and Russia. Xi Jinping lent Argentina billions in the lead up to the election to stave off economic collapse and allow Massa a chance to win.
Joe Biden, despite Massa receiving direct aid from Putin and Xi Jinping, also met with him in Washington and seemingly signed off on ex-Obama campaign aides assisting his efforts.
Milei’s victory, then, is not only a win for the right but a defeat for the establishment. It is not yet a total one. Read coverage in the Financial Times or New York Times, and it will be filled with “reassurance” that Milei will be hemmed in by an opposition-controlled congress.
The entire global establishment will absolutely be working to ensure that Milei fails. Without the ability to implement his economic reforms in full due to obstruction from the national congress, Milei’s government would be dependent on the willingness of foreign debtors to extend loans, something that his plans for dollarization threaten to eliminate. If he goes “too rogue,” they can probably topple him by turning the lights off.
Nonetheless, major world leaders would not have fought so hard to prevent Milei from becoming president if he posed no threat.
The clearest place where Milei will be able to wield power is the realm of foreign policy. His Peronist predecessors were aligned with the international left, which, if not openly backing Putin or Xi, subtly supported their ambitions by purporting to champion “multipolarity.”
Figures like Brazil’s Lula seem to believe that the relative decline of the United States and its allies is a good thing as it will lead to a “more equitable world” where countries like Brazil can play the great powers against one another. That is likely why Lula worked against a Ukrainian victory and pressed for a ceasefire to lock in Russian gains, as proving the U.S. and its allies could not deter Russian aggression by force was more important. Similarly, it is why Brazil has pushed so heavily for a ceasefire in Gaza.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have no desire for a more equitable world. If anything, they likely find the very word “equitable” detestable. ‘Neutralists” such as India’s Jawaharlal Nehru have always been useful idiots for Communists dating back to the Soviet era because they shared the same goal of weakening the position of the United States. That is why Xi has been willing to bankroll these regimes, as a multipolar world where the U.S. cannot impose its will is a world where no one can stop China.
If it is clear why Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin opposed Milei’s election, it is much less explicable why the Biden administration would have. Why would the Biden administration have wanted someone, Massa, who is dedicated to opposing U.S. unilateral action, rather than someone who supports U.S. global predominance like Milei?
The answer is that the members of Biden’s foreign policy teams themselves oppose U.S. unilateral action, and the greatest opposition to their policy comes not from America’s rivals abroad but from fellow Americans at home.
The Biden administration does not want to support Israel unconditionally in Gaza. Doing so would further split their own party, offend Justin Trudeau, and undermine their efforts at rapprochement with Iran.
However, they also do not want to be seen as abandoning Israel. The ideal situation is thus one in which they are forced to pressure Israel into a ceasefire by world opinion.
Similarly, if the U.S. ends up abandoning Ukraine and forcing Kyiv into ceding territory to Russia, it is much better to be able to blame it on “world opinion.” Even inaction on things like the U.S. border and abortion policy along with crime are justified by citing the risk of offending international opinion.
In short, the Biden administration needs non-supportive, if not antagonistic, world leaders abroad to justify policies they know are unpopular at home. The most dangerous foreign leaders in the eyes of the Biden team, and Obama’s before him, are not the Lulas of the world, but figures such as Bolsonaro, Netanyahu, and Orban who undermine Democrats’ argument that they are being “forced” into actions by a world consensus against America, even though American liberals want to undertake those actions anyway.
When Orban is able to be outspokenly socially conservative, the argument that America cannot be an “outlier” vanishes. The Biden administration cannot possibly risk appearing less pro-Israel than Brazil, and if Bolsonaro was in office strongly backing Netanyahu, Biden would be trapped. Netanyahu’s unwillingness to follow dictates ensures that support for Israel comes with real costs, rather than consisting of empty platitudes.
Milei’s election was also followed up by Geert Wilders’ triumph in the Netherlands. Both will be major pains in Biden’s backside when it comes to international affairs. Both are climate skeptics at a time when John Kerry is trying to justify appeasing Beijing on the basis that cooperation on climate change is more important than protecting our allies in the South China Sea.
Wilders followed up his recent victory by declaring that “Jordan is Palestine” on X, while Milei has gone further by visiting New York’s embattled Jewish community at a time when Biden is bragging about extending a ceasefire with Hamas. At the very moment when Biden’s team is desperately trying to pivot away from Israel, the elections of the last two weeks are threatening to bring to power leaders who will make that politically painful.
The victory of Milei is not merely a victory for the Argentine people. It is also a victory for democracy in the United States, as it will make the Biden administration more accountable. It will force Biden to justify his policies on his own merits, and with Milei in office, it will be impossible to claim that the “whole world” is against Donald Trump.
It is obvious why the Biden team is bitter about Milei’s victory. But American leaders need to break the cycle of seeing their own population as their enemy. Only then can they learn to welcome figures like Milei and work with them to build a better world for all.
Walter Samuel is the pseudonym of a prolific international affairs writer and academic. He has worked in Washington as well as in London and Asia, and holds a Doctorate in International History.
