AMAC Exclusive – By Daniel Roman
One of the analogies frequently employed to explain Russia’s “strategic concerns” about NATO expansion in Eastern Europe has been to compare Ukraine joining NATO to the prospect of Mexico joining the Warsaw Pact during the height of the Cold War. It is noted, correctly, that the U.S. would not have tolerated such a development, either under the Monroe Doctrine or as a matter of pure self-defense. The Kennedy administration considered the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba sufficiently provocative to risk starting World War III to demand their removal. It is thus puzzling why President Biden, faced with Russian “security” demands in Ukraine, has not countered with demands of his own for the Russians to cease interference in the Western Hemisphere – namely, terminating Russia’s military support of and presence in hostile, anti-American, expansionist regimes in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.
In just the last week, as Russia has been insisting that even the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO could lead to war between America and Russia, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov embarked on a tour of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in what the official news agency, TASS, described as a bid for “improving mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation.” When it came to Venezuela, however, the topic shifted quickly to military cooperation. “Russia is fully supported by Venezuela in the face of the threats from NATO and the Western world,” stated the Russian-sounding Venezuelan Defense Minister, Vladimir Padrino after the meeting. Borisov called Venezuela “a strategic partner for Russia in Latin America” while Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro announced that “We are going to increase all the preparation, training and cooperation plans with a military power in the world such as Russia.”
Coming a month after the Russian government would neither confirm nor deny that Moscow could send military assets to Cuba or Venezuela, it is clear that Moscow’s relationship with those powers is precisely what it alleges Kiev’s is with Washington. Namely, the Russians are openly using them to try to threaten and exert pressure on the United States.
It was normal in the Cold War for each side to maintain “pressure points” on the others. This allowed for retaliation without immediately escalating to full-scale conflict. The Soviet Union maintained the ability to march into Berlin if the U.S. invaded Cuba, and vice versa. What is shocking is that even though the Russians seem to remember this tactic and are in the process of implementing it, Washington seems indifferent. While the Biden administration has wisely held off reviving the Obama administration’s efforts to normalize ties with a Cuban government which displays no desire for either friendly relations with the United States or ceasing the oppression of the Cuban people, Biden has not made an issue of Cuba’s clearly hostile moves against the United States itself. While it may well be true that the direct military options that would be available to the Biden administration to respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine are limited, it would be much easier for the United States to exert pressure on Cuba or Venezuela, and almost impossible for Russia to interfere.
Venezuela would be highly vulnerable to a naval blockade of Caracas. Not only is the Maduro regime dependent on oil exports for its only source of hard currency, but, unable to trust its own military, the regime relies heavily on Cuban military forces, Russian mercenaries, and even Hezbollah fighters. Merely imposing a naval blockade might well trigger the collapse of the regime, and while it would be a provocative move in peacetime, Venezuela has by its own words aligned itself militarily with whatever actions Russia takes in Ukraine. It would be justified to take Maduro at his word when he says, “We have walked the 21st century together, the people, the government of Russia and Venezuela.”
Even the threat of retaliation against Russia’s puppets in the Americas would greatly increase the options available to the Biden administration. If a negotiated solution is to be reached, placing the survival of the regimes in Havana and Caracas in doubt may make Russia more conciliatory. If the U.S. were to threaten an invasion of Cuba or Venezuela, and then not do so, the Kremlin might feel pressure to balance that act of goodwill with gestures of its own. In this way, even the appearance that the U.S. is refraining from launching invasions it never intended to undertake might allow Putin to claim a domestic win to justify abandoning an invasion of the Ukraine. Putin is too invested at the moment to cave under Western pressure without some way to save face with the Russian people and claim some sort of victory.
The Biden administration faces difficult challenges. Every administration does. But there are options available, and it is past time they considered steps to hit Russian interests in the Western Hemisphere where such moves will cost little, yield much, and potentially act as a warning to China regarding expansion into America’s backyard.
Daniel Roman is the pen name of a frequent commentator and lecturer on foreign policy and political affairs, both nationally and internationally. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics.