Oversight of any enterprise – federal, state, or local government, big or small business – is about wanting the bad news. Hearing things are “fine” when they are not is for weak managers, not leaders.
In October 2001, the US went to war in Afghanistan. In March 2003, we went to war in Iraq. While I had nothing to do with those decisions, I volunteered for active duty with US Naval Intelligence after 9-11. In October 2003, I was asked by the President to train all police in Afghanistan and Iraq.
While new, I viewed the assignment as manageable and accepted. Nominated, unanimously confirmed by the US Senate, I was sworn in on October 3, 2003, as Assistant Secretary of State (INL).
While producing thousands of police was Job One, bringing down drug cartels in spots like Colombia, oversight was also Job One. It had to be, since that part of the department had not been well led. Whenever big money is involved, oversight is critical.
The job of managing global counter-narcotics and law enforcement involved billions. Producing operational outcomes on a tight timeline, training tens of thousands of police officers, bringing down drug traffickers, and hiring and firing were fine. Oversight was fine – as I had been chief counsel for a chunk of the US House Oversight Committee, and I ran the WACO hearings, immigration, counter-narcotics, and terrorism.
The issue that forced focus was how to inspire outcomes and corral thousands of employees and hundreds of contractors with personal agendas. Bureaucracies are like that; the private sector is not. Adding weight, House Republicans – who trusted me – then added a billion dollars to the budget.
In short, I did what most would never do. I called the department’s Inspector General in on my own operation and asked him to take it apart piece by piece until we knew where all the problems were, so I could start fixing them. I then elevated a CPA to my principal deputy and empowered him.
Within months, we had recovered tens of millions of dollars from rogue embassies, terminated underperforming programs, forced contractors to write checks back to the US government for fraud and overbilling, and ended the tenures of unneeded staff, while building for success.
The level of efficiency achieved was extraordinary. We imposed and made real new performance measures, dramatically improved financial accountability controls, forced outcomes, not outputs, took a 200-strong airwing – helicopters and airplanes – from 60 to 85 percent operational readiness, trained the Iraqi and Afghan police, hit drug cartels hard, and created a culture of accountability.
Looking back, the mission was nearly impossible, but we – a capable, motivated, trustworthy team – did it. That mission success helped stabilize both countries and others from Colombia to Kosovo, and set in motion practices that, to this day, are used to improve government accountability.
Nothing is forever, and nothing is perfect, but my idea – that leaders should, at the time of leadership turnover, seek a new Inspector General’s assessment – stuck. When I left, or four months later, an Inspector General’s report was done on the operation I had led.
In the field, we achieved unthinkably high outcomes, normalized accountability for employees and contractors, putting part of the federal government on track. In DC, the only part reviewed by the IG after we left received exceptionally high marks, despite unprecedented pressure on State at the time.
Wrote the IG: “During the last 18 months, we’ve worked to address weaknesses in the operations and should be commended for recognizing problems and taking corrective action,” adding “room for improvement” remained – as always – and noting we “achieved significant progress strengthening financial management controls.”
As the IG wrote: “In a period of extraordinary challenges, our ‘highly professional, dedicated staff have a solid record of achievement in Iraq, Afghanistan, and with its other programs.” The reason we were able to move that far, that fast, with that kind of outcome was: We asked for the “bad news.”
So, looking at how states create efficiency and accountability, and get things right for taxpayers, the lessons are basic. Maximize accountability. Put non-partisan “Inspector Generals” in departments, then unleash them to investigate, so you can fix things and deliver results. That is leadership.
Robert Charles is a former Assistant Secretary of State under Colin Powell, former Reagan and Bush 41 White House staffer, Maine attorney, ten-year naval intelligence officer (USNR), and 25-year businessman. He wrote “Narcotics and Terrorism” (2003), “Eagles and Evergreens” (North Country Press, 2018), and “Cherish America: Stories of Courage, Character, and Kindness” (Tower Publishing, 2024). He is the National Spokesman for AMAC. Today, he is running to be Maine’s next Governor (please visit BobbyforMaine.com to learn more)!
